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Retail payments: integration and innovation 
“Retail payments: integration and innovation” was the title of the joint conference organised by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) in Frankfurt am Main on 25 and 26 May 2009. Around 200 high-level 
policy-makers, academics, experts and central bankers from more than 30 countries of all five continents attended the 
conference, reflecting the high level of interest in retail payments. 
The aim of the conference was to better understand current developments in retail payment markets and to identify 
possible future trends, by bringing together policy conduct, research activities and market practice. The conference was 
organised around two major topics: first, the economic and regulatory implications of a more integrated retail payments 
market and, second, the strands of innovation and modernisation in the retail payments business. To make innovations 
successful, expectations and requirements of retail payment users have to be taken seriously. The conference has shown 
that these expectations and requirements are strongly influenced by the growing demand for alternative banking 
solutions, the increasing international mobility of individuals and companies, a loss of trust in the banking industry and 
major social trends such as the ageing population in developed countries. There are signs that customers see a need for 
more innovative payment solutions. Overall, the conference led to valuable findings which will further stimulate our 
efforts to foster the economic underpinnings of innovation and integration in retail banking and payments. 
We would like to take this opportunity to thank all participants in the conference. In particular, we would like to 
acknowledge the valuable contributions of all presenters, discussants, session chairs and panellists, whose names can be 
found in the enclosed conference programme. Their main statements are summarised in the ECB-DNB official 
conference summary. Twelve papers related to the conference have been accepted for publication in this special series 
of the ECB Working Papers Series. 
Behind the scenes, a number of colleagues from the ECB and DNB contributed to both the organisation of the 
conference and the preparation of this conference report. In alphabetical order, many thanks to Alexander Al-Haschimi, 
Wilko Bolt, Hans Brits, Maria Foskolou, Susan Germain de Urday, Philipp Hartmann, Päivi Heikkinen, Monika 
Hempel, Cornelia Holthausen, Nicole Jonker, Anneke Kosse, Thomas Lammer, Johannes Lindner, Tobias Linzert, 
Daniela Russo, Wiebe Ruttenberg, Heiko Schmiedel, Francisco Tur Hartmann, Liisa Väisänen, and Pirjo Väkeväinen. 
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This paper analyzes the welfare implications of creating a Single Euro Payments Area.
We study the e®ects of increased network compatibility and payment scale economies
on consumer and merchant card fees and its impact on card usage. In particular, we
model competition among debit cards and between debit and credit cards. We show that
competitive pressures dampen merchant fees and increase total card acceptance. The
paper argues that there is room for multilateral interchange fee arrangements to achieve
optimal consumer and merchant fees, taking safety, income uncertainty, default risk,
merchant's pricing power, and the avoided cost of cash at the retailers side into account.
Consumers and merchants are likely to bene¯t the most from the creation of SEPA when
su±cient payment card competition alleviates potential monopolistic tendencies.
Key Words: SEPA, card network competition, optimal pricing, economic welfare
JEL Codes: L11, G21, D53
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One of the most signi¯cant long-term trends in the way we pay and merchant sell goods
and services has been a continuing shift away from the use of cash and checks towards more
innovative and electronic means of payment. Today, payment cards are indispensable in
most advanced economies. For Europe, the number of payment cards increased by 140
percent across 11 countries during the period 1987-2004 (Bolt and Humphrey, 2007), and
by now payment cards have become the most used non-cash payment instrument in Europe.
Focusing on 13 countries, Amromin and Chakravorti (2009) ¯nd that greater usage of debit
cards has resulted in lower demand for small-denomination bank notes and coins that are use
to make change. Furthermore, apart from high growth rates, payment cards have also been
proven to be a simple, safe, and cost-e±cient payment instrument.
At the European level, the realization of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) repre-
sents a major step towards closer European integration. Within SEPA all euro payments in
the euro area are treated as domestic payments. SEPA may bring substantial economic ben-
e¯ts and opportunities as it will foster competition and innovation, and improve conditions
for consumers and merchants (Schmiedel, 2007). Owing to strong scale economies in the pay-
ment industry, it is likely that SEPA will spur substantial consolidation of payment networks,
infrastructures and processing operations across borders to allow banks, merchants and con-
sumers to bene¯t from these cost e±ciencies (Beijnen and Bolt, 2009; Bolt and Humphrey,
2007).
Payment cards play an important role in the overall success of SEPA. Yet, at the current
stage, the \cards dossier" is facing unfavorable developments. In particular, the European
cards market continues to be still very fragmented along national borders and there is a risk
of decreased competition when only a few payment schemes are likely to \survive". The
developments within SEPA for cards have called for the need of an European-led initiative
to create at least one additional European card scheme. This new card scheme is envis-
aged to function in addition to and in competition with two already existing international
schemes that have well-established positions at the European level. Complementing the
political motivations to maintain or regain strategic control over the European cards market,
it is expected that an additional European card scheme brings economic bene¯ts not only
5
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pressures and the increased use of cards.
Against this background, the present paper studies whether positive welfare e®ects can
be expected from the creation of SEPA. In our analysis we assume that increased compat-
ibility between card systems across countries and economies of scale in card processing are
the main economic drivers for SEPA. We study the e®ects of increased compatibility and
scale economies on consumer and merchant fees of debit and credit cards and their usage.
Moreover, the paper analyzes potential impact of the emergence of an additional European
card scheme on pricing decisions by card networks and merchant acceptance, as well as its
implications for economic welfare. Payment cards o®er bene¯ts to consumers and merchants
in terms of safety and income insurance.1 Moreover, by accepting cards, merchants avoid
costs of cash handling and cash management. Clearly, the use of cash is not a free lunch.
Ultimately, consumers and merchants must tradeo® increased consumption possibilities and
avoided cost against payment fees for using cards. This tradeo® between cards versus cash
determines the ability of card network to extract surplus from consumers and merchants and
is re°ected in the level of the payment fees. In this paper, as a potential market outcome of
SEPA, we also model two competitive payment networks which set payment prices to con-
sumers and merchants in their pursuit of market share and pro¯t. Competitive pressures
dampen the merchant fee and hence a®ect multilateral interchange fee (MIF) arrangements
between issuers and acquirers. The importance of the merchant fee and MIF has been re-
vived by Mastercard's recent decision to cut their cross-border MIFs in order to comply with
EU antitrust rules.2
Many important contributions in the academic literature have addressed key issues sur-
rounding card payment networks in general and payment pricing and interchange fees in
particular (e.g., Baxter, 1983; Rochet and Tirole, 2002; Schmalensee, 2002; Wright, 2004;
Chakravorti and To, 2007). These studies di®er in their various assumptions about con-
sumers, merchants, technology, and market structure. Although a number of important
¯ndings have emerged from this literature, they have not yet provided much guidance for
1Our analysis draws upon on a model by Bolt and Chakravorti (2008a), although they do not study the
e®ects of compatibility and competition on payment prices.
2In December 2007 the EC ruled that the MIFs charged for cross-border transaction made with MasterCard
violated EC Treaty regulations.
6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1140
December 2009the current policy debate regarding the creation and integration of future European retail
payment markets. In particular, the existing literature is silent about the potential e®ects of
SEPA for payment cards and about the economic implications of competitive card schemes
for consumer and merchant welfare.3 This imbalance in the literature is even more surprising
when seen in the light of the potentially large economic bene¯ts that SEPA o®ers to banks,
non-banks, corporations, consumers, and society as a whole (European Commission, 2008;
Schmiedel, 2007). In particular, Hasan, Schmiedel, and Song (2009) provide ¯rst supporting
empirical evidence on the importance and signi¯cance of retail payment services for banks
and banking industry. Our paper is a ¯rst attempt to theoretically assess the bene¯ts of
creating SEPA.
Our analysis shows that increased compatibility and payment scale economies dampen
optimal merchant fees. This increases merchant acceptance of payment cards, which in
turn raises the consumer willingness to pay for cards. Higher cost of cash increases the
potential for card networks to extract economic surplus by raising merchant fees. Due to
payment externalities, socially optimal merchant fees and pro¯t-maximizing merchant fees
need not be equal. In particular, with relatively high processing costs and large default risk,
socially optimal merchant fees can even be higher than pro¯t-maximizing ones in order to
deter merchants from accepting. Our results would indeed suggest that MIFs|as a function
of the merchant fee|may be necessary to optimally balance the two sides of the payment
market. Competition between debit and credit cards dramatically decreases merchant fees
for both types of cards, which indicates that creating an additional European payment scheme
within SEPA will boost merchant acceptance and card usage, but does not necessarily lead
to the \best" outcome for economic welfare.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of
recent developments in European payment markets with a special focus on card payments
and the emergence of additional European card schemes. Section 3 discusses and puts into
perspective most recent studies related to payment networks and payment competition as
well as expected economic impact of the SEPA project. Section 4 presents a model of SEPA
and payment cards. Section 5 and 6 focus on price and welfare comparisons of di®erent
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2 Recent developments in European payment markets
2.1 Signi¯cance of card payments in Europe
A well-functioning ¯nancial system allows an economy to fully exploit its growth potential,
as it ensures that the best real investment opportunities receive the necessary funding (ECB,
2009). Similar to other ¯nancial innovations, cashless transactions make ¯nancial markets
more complete, allow transaction costs to be low and, most importantly, facilitate the ex-
change of goods and services. Against this background signi¯cant changes in the use of
cashless payments have taken place over time on a global scale; the number of cashless trans-
actions, e.g. credit transfers, direct debit, card payments and e-money payments, has risen
in many advanced economies over time. Over the last few years, volumes of cashless pay-
ments in the European Union have increased by about 6 percent per year. In Europe, as the
left panel of Figure 1 demonstrates, card payments experienced the highest growth of more
than 10 percent and have become the most used non-cash payment instrument, with over 25
billion payments per year. In particular, considering card payments in the euro area the use
of debit card payments show the strongest growth and development over time compared to
credit card transactions as shown in the right panel of Figure 1.
Despite similar trends of cashless payments at a global level, the European retail pay-
ments market is still fragmented and national payment habits di®er leading to substantial
asymmetries in cashless payment usage. As shown in Figure 2, within the euro area, the
Austrians, Finns and Dutch are the most frequent users of cashless payments, while the
Portuguese, Spanish, Italians and, in particular, Greeks are the least frequent ones.
Although in the future di®erent preferences for payment instruments may remain, cus-
tomers' habits when purchasing goods and services are changing. More competition, more
choice and new business opportunities, for example in the cards market, will in°uence their
habits and could encourage a greater use of cards. Innovative payment solutions, such as
online payments, are also likely to change customers' habits. Overall, recent developments
and changes in the payments market reveal great opportunities and potential for non-cash
8
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Billion transactions
Credit transfers Direct debits Cards
Cheques E-money transactions
Source: ECB
Notes: Cards includes all cards except e-money function issued in the euro area (cards with credit, debit, 
credit/delayed debit, debit/delayed debit or delayed debit function). The percentages are the Compound 
Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) mean of the growth of transactions  2000-2007 in euro area.  
CAGR is calculated by the following formula:                                         where t is the number of years and       







































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Billion transactions
Debit cards Credit cards
Source: ECB
Notes: Debit cards include cards with a debit function and credit cards include both cards with credit 
function and cards with credit and delayed debit function. All cards are issued in the euro area. 
 
 
Note: Euro area includes all EU countries that have adopted the euro. In the left panel, cards include
all payment cards issued in the euro area except for cards with an e-money function. The shown
percentages are the mean of the compound annual growth rates (CAGR) of transactions. In the right
panel, debit cards include cards with a debit function and credit cards include cards with both a credit
function and a credit combined with delayed debit function. All cards are issued in the euro area.
Source: ECB.
payments. In particular, cards are becoming the most important payment instrument in
the euro area. Only cash is used more frequently, but generally for only small payments.
Besides their widespread usage, cards are also a safe, e±cient and reliable payment instru-
ment. There is still a considerable growth potential for cards in many countries. Reducing
the use of cash in favor of cards is likely to bene¯t not only banks, but also consumers and
merchants. Naturally, society as a whole is best o® when it relies more heavily on the most
e±cient payment system.
2.2 Emergence of additional European card schemes
At the European level, the realization of the Single Euro Payments Area aims at removing
the technical, legal and commercial barriers. SEPA makes non-cash euro payments as easy,
e±cient and safe as it is today within one country. SEPA may bring substantial economic
bene¯ts and opportunities from potential economies of scale and scope, thereby increasing
the overall economic e±ciency of the payments industry. Moreover, SEPA entails shifts in
service levels and the development of new, innovative payment products for consumers and
merchant. Payment cards play here an important role.
9
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Notes: The number of cashless transactions represents the number of cashless payment  transactions per capita by 
non-MFIs including credit transfers, direct debits, card payments, cheques and e-money payment transactions. The 
number 2000-2006 is the average nunber of cashless transactions per capita in the 2000-2007 in euro area. 
 
Note: Number of non-cash transactions per capita by non-MFIs including credit transfers, direct
debits, card payments and e-money payment transactions. The 2000-20006 number is the average
over the period 2000-2006. Source: ECB.
SEPA for cards is motivated via gradual standardization and the opening of domestic
markets to increase the opportunities of more card usage. Through more choice and cost-
e±ciency, competition should be introduced and increased in the areas of card schemes,
issuing, acquiring, acceptance and processing. However, it is observed that the European
cards market is still very fragmented along national borders and that the market for cross-
border card transactions is almost served exclusively by two international card schemes.
National card schemes, which have been proven to deliver e±cient solutions to domestic
payment needs, are at risk of \extinction" as banks are reconsidering their participation. As a
result, there is the possibility that the future perspective for cards entails limited competition
when only a duopoly of international schemes are active.
These developments within SEPA regarding payment cards have called for support to cre-
ate an additional European card scheme that meets the requirements of cardholders, banks,
merchants, public and competition authorities. At least three European, market-led initia-
tives have emerged and are currently discussed at the political and commercial level. The
Euro Alliance of Payment Schemes (EAPS), the Monnet initiative, and the PayFair initiative
10
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MIF level [% per transaction] 2007 2009
Credit cards 0.8%-1.9% 0.3%
Debit cards 0.4%-0.75% 0.2%
have entered the payment arena. EAPS is based on interlinkages between six card schemes
from Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the UK and EUFISERV. It foresees that cards of the
issuers network will be accepted at all terminals of participating card acquirers. The Monnet
initiative targets the creation of a new scheme and is currently driven by German and French
banks. Payfair is a private initiative comprising a merchant-oriented debit card scheme.
Without favoring any of these proposed new European card scheme solutions and initia-
tives, this paper explores whether potential social welfare gains can be expected from addi-
tional competition between card schemes. Despite the e®orts of the above mentioned market
initiatives to create an additional European card scheme, further clarity may be needed on
the set-up, determination and level of a possible multilateral interchange fee (MIF) for such
new card schemes.
In fact, recently the European Commission took note of MasterCard's decision to apply
a new methodology which results in reduced average weighted MIF levels compared initial
levels which were violating EU antitrust rules. As indicated in the table 1, the maximum
weighted average MIF is cut to 0.30% for consumer credit cards and to 0.20% for consumer
debit cards. For comparison, depending on the card, MasterCard's cross-border MIFs ranged
from 0.8% to 1.90% in 2007. Debit card cross-border MIFs ranged from more than 0.40% to
more than 0.75%. From an economic perspective, the present paper explores the implications
of an approach towards MIF that would allow banks to o®er card products to cardholders
and merchants that can truly compete with cash.
3 Literature review
Over recent years the economic literature has witnessed an abundance of theoretical analyses
regarding payment pricing and interchange fees. From an antitrust perspective, many authors
have analyzed the potential competitive e®ects of the collective setting of interchange fees
within payment card schemes (Baxter, 1983; Carlton and Frankel, 1995, Frankel, 1998; Chang
11
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2003).4 Formal models have been developed that focus on the role and nature of interchange
fees|which is to reallocate funds between the two sides of the market|and on volumes of
activity in payment card networks. These models have been developed drawing parallels with
other (two-sided) network industries like internet, media, video games and software (Rochet
and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Wright, 2004; Armstrong, 2006). Essentially, these models di®er in
their various assumptions about consumers, merchants, technology, and market structure.
Retail payment systems bear important characteristics of two-sided markets (Rochet,
2007). That is, the consumption of card payment services involves two sides of the transaction|
a consumer and a merchant|each of whom takes actions, enjoys bene¯ts, and incurs costs.
Economic theory has shown that setting the right price structure (e.g., the ratio of the
consumer fee and merchant fee) is crucial for consumer card usage, merchant acceptance
decisions, and resulting levels of economic welfare and e±ciency. Interchange fees can be
viewed as instruments to attain this optimal price structure, and to provide necessary incen-
tives to guarantee the participation of all parties in the card payment system. An important
lesson of this analysis is that the socially optimal consumer, merchant and interchange fee
will depend on both bene¯ts and costs realized by each side of the transaction. Theoretically,
purely cost-based merchant fees or zero MIFs are unlikely to attain full e±ciency. Pro¯t-
maximizing payment fees can be heavily skewed to one side of the market (e.g., Bolt and
Tieman, 2008). Typically, merchants are less price-elastic than cardholders, and often bear
the full burden of joint payment cost. However, this does not necessarily contradict a socially
e±cient market outcome, as long as the ability to extract surplus does not turn into abusive
and socially wasteful rent seeking.
The European Commission (2008) points out that the potential bene¯ts from SEPA in
the European payment markets alone could exceed EUR 123 billion over the next six years.
Further bene¯ts are possible if SEPA can be used as a platform for electronic invoicing.
Similarly under the condition that more electronic payments will be promoted in SEPA,
Kemppainen (2008) and Schaefer (2008) state that SEPA is overall bene¯cial. Schmiedel
(2007) concludes that banks within SEPA may signi¯cantly reduce their payment costs, but
will face increased competition putting downward pressure on prices and revenues. Further
4See Bolt and Chakravorti (2008b) for a recent survey of the economic literature on payment cards.
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standardization of retail payments payment instruments across the euro area are likely to
result in economies of scale in providing payment services in Europe. Similar economies
of scale e®ects are to be realized in the European payment processing industry and that
signi¯cant cost e±ciency gains can be expected from continued consolidation across borders
(Beijnen and Bolt, 2009).
Our analysis draws upon a model by Bolt and Chakravorti (2008a). They study the
ability of banks and merchants to in°uence the consumer's payment instrument choice when
they have access to three payment forms|cash, debit card, and credit card. Their analysis
combines elements of \two-sided" models that stress price structure with those that consider
consumers' liquidity constraints and security concerns. In addition, they consider how banks
set prices when they participate in multiple payment networks (\payment substitution").5
Our paper di®ers in the sense that compatibility issues, avoided cost of cash, economies of
scale and competition between card networks are explicitly modeled and analyzed. These
elements are important to assess the welfare implications of creating SEPA. To our knowledge,
this has not yet been done in the literature. This paper attempts to start ¯lling this gap.
4 A model of SEPA and payment cards
The model consider two countries, A and B. In country A (a \debit card" country), consumers
may use cash or debit cards to pay for their purchases. In contrast, in country B (a \credit
card" country) consumers may only use cash and credit cards. In both countries, there are
three types of agents|consumers, merchants, and a monopolist card network.6 All agents
are risk neutral. There is a (mass one) continuum of (ex ante identical) consumers and a
(mass one) continuum of merchants that have (some) market power. Merchants in each
country are di®erentiated by the type of good they sell and the pro¯t margin they realize
when serving each customer. Countries A and B are of equal size, N.
5Much of the payment literature focuses on the intensive margin|how fees in°uence usage|instead of the
extensive margin|how fees a®ect adoption|or does not distinguish the two. Notable exceptions are Bedre
and Calvano(2009), Bolt and Chakravorti (2008a), and Chakravorti and Roson (2006).
6In our model, we have combined the issuer and acquirer into one entity so as to abstract from the
interchange fee decision between issuers and acquirers. A four-party network is mathematically equivalent to
a three-party network when issuing or acquiring is perfectly competitive. In that case, the optimal interchange
fee is directly derived from the optimal consumer and merchant fee (e.g. Bolt, 2006).
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merchant that they are matched to. A consumer receives utility v0 = v ¡p from purchasing
the good at price p, where v0 ¸ 0. At the break of day consumers have no available funds,
so that they need additional income to shop. Consumers are subject to three shocks. First,
income arrives in the morning with probability Á1, or at night with probability Á2, where
Á1 + Á2 · 1. Second, before shopping, each consumer is randomly matched to a merchant
selling a unique good. With probability ¯ the consumer is matched to a domestic merchant,
with probability 1 ¡ ¯ to a foreign merchant. Third, a cash-carrying consumer may be
mugged in transit to the merchant with probability 1¡½, resulting in complete loss of income
and utility. These probabilities (Á1;Á2;¯;½) are given exogenously, and for convenience
assumed equal across both countries.7 Consumers maximize expected (linear) utility and
they only have positive utility when consuming goods sold by the merchant they are matched
to. Consumption can only occur during the day, income that remains after ¯xed fees have
been deducted renders no utility.
Merchant heterogeneity is based on the type of good that they sell and their pro¯t margin.
Each merchant i realizes a unique exogenously given pro¯t margin ¼j(i), j = A;B. We
assume that merchant pro¯t margins on a sold unit of good are uniformly distributed on a
line segment from 0 to p. That is, although each merchant sells its good at unit price p,
merchants have di®erent pro¯t margins due to di®erent underlying production costs. We
make this assumption to capture merchant pricing power heterogeneity in the economy in a
tractable model. Extraction of consumer surplus through merchant pricing is measured by v0.
Local monopolists will not leave any consumer surplus and set v = p, so that v0 = 0. More
competitive market structures are characterized by v0 > 0. Without loss of generality we
normalize p = 1. When accepting a card payment, the merchant avoids a (per-transaction)
cash handling cost h (assumed equal in both countries), but incurs a per-transaction fee (or
so-called merchant discount) fj, j = A;B, charged by the card network.
It is throughout assumed that cash services in each country are supplied (by a central
bank) at zero cost and that access to cash is without charges for consumers. Besides cash, the
7The Financial Times (FT, July 1, 2009) recently reported that losses on US credit cards hit a record of
more than 10 percent in June, 2009. In our model this would translate to Á1 + Á2 = 0:9. If none of the losses
would ever be recovered on these loans, we may set Á2 = 0. With respect to safety, based on Italian crime
statistics, Alvarez and Lippi (2007) estimate the probability of cash theft around 2 percent in Italy in 2004,
implying ½ = 0:98 in our model.
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Exogenous variables:
v0 utility for consumer
Á1 probability of receiving income early
Á2 probability of receiving income late
¯ probability of being matched to domestic merchant
½ probability of safe transit when carrying cash
h per-transaction merchant handling cost of cash
¼j merchant-speci¯c pro¯t margin, j = A;B
p price for retail good (normalized to p = 1)
cj per-transaction card processing cost, j = A;B
N country size
Endogenous variables:
®j proportion of domestic merchants accepting cards, j = A;B
Fj ¯xed consumer fee for having a card, j = A;B
fj per-transaction merchant fee for a card payment, j = A;B
monopolist card network provides additional payment services. Debit cards o®er consumers
protection against theft whereas credit cards hedge against both theft and (temporary) in-
su±cient income. The supply of card services by each card network increases the states of
the world where consumption occurs. The card network incurs a processing cost cj ¸ 0,
j = A;B, where we assume cA · cB per card transaction. That is, we assume that credit
card processing takes more resources than debit card processing due to increased monitoring
and screening activities by the network. Credit cards also carry more default risk than debit
cards|modeled through the probability of late income arrival Á2, with 0 · '2 · 1 ¡ '1.
For convenience, we assume that the card network can only charge non-negative payment
fees to consumers and merchants.8 Each card network charges consumers membership fees
to use payment cards, Fj ¸ 0, j = A;B, and sets merchant per-transaction fees, fj ¸ 0,
j = A;B, for card transactions.9 Consumers that choose to participate in a card network
8Our model is able to consider negative fees in a straightforward way. However, allowing negative fees
makes the analysis more complex without gaining additional insight. Note, that negative merchant fees do
not increase merchant acceptance any further, so that network pro¯t will only decrease for larger negative fees
under the no-surcharge rule. Therefore, allowing negative fees will not a®ect optimal pricing, see also Bolt
and Chakravorti (2008a).
9This fee structure captures what we observe in many countries. Generally, consumers do not pay per-
transaction fees when using their payment cards, but merchants generally do pay the bulk of their payment
service fees on a per-transaction basis. In addition, banks can use a strategy to price cash as well. We ignore
this aspect primarily because of the complexity of solving a model with six di®erent prices for payment services.
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and realize total pro¯ts
sign fully enforceable contracts stipulating that ¯xed fees are automatically transferred when
income arrives. For convenience, we consider one merchant fee for all merchants, although,
in reality, di®erent merchants face di®erent fees for payment services. In line with pay-
ment industry common practices, we assume that merchants are prohibited from surcharging
consumers who pay by card (the so-called No Surcharge Rule).
For reference, we list the exogenous and endogenous variables that appear in our model in
table 2. The timing of events is depicted in ¯gure 3. In the early morning, card networks post
their fees for payment services, merchants announce their acceptance of card services, and
consumers choose whether to subscribe to the card network. Next, some consumers realize
their income and are matched with a speci¯c merchant|domestic or foreign. Consumers
decide which payment instrument to use before leaving home based on merchant acceptance.
During the day, consumers go shopping. At night, consumers that did not receive income in
the morning may receive income and pay back their (potential) card obligations.
5 Pre-SEPA phase: incompatibility
The pre-SEPA phase is characterized by an incompatibility friction. We assume that payment
card systems are not compatible across countries A and B. That is, debit cards issued in
country A cannot be used for payment in country B, and vice versa, credit cards issued
16
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probability 1¡¯ for each consumer) must be paid by cash, and hence require su±cient funds
and are subject to theft.
5.1 Country A: debit card pricing
Country A is a debit card country. When compared to cash, debit cards are more secure
for consumers to carry than cash because cash-carrying consumers have some probability of
being mugged. We endogenously determine the proportion of merchants in country A that
accepts debit cards and denote it as ®A. Because debit cards may not be accepted by all
merchants, consumers must use cash for some purchases. Moreover, foreign purchases must
be paid for in cash. Consumers can consume in an additional ¯®A(1 ¡ ½) states of nature.
Consumers are willing to participate in a debit card network if the ¯xed fee, FA, is
less than or equal to the expected utility from additional consumption. On the one hand,
shopping with cash requires income in the morning and runs the risk of getting mugged.
On the other hand, shopping with debit cards guarantees safe transit to the merchant who
accepts the card, but still requires early income. The ¯xed fee for subscribing to the card
network must balance these opposing e®ects. In other words, the following inequality must
be satis¯ed:
Á1½v0 · Á1((1 ¡ ¯®A)½ + ¯®A)v0 ¡ (Á1 + Á2)FA: (1)
This inequality yields the maximum debit card fee, FA
max, that consumers are willing to pay
as a function of exogenous parameters, ½, Á1, Á2, ¯, and v0, and endogenous parameter,
®A. Note that income may never arrive at all, so that the ¯xed fee cannot be paid and the
network bears the full cost of issuing the debit card. Given that consumers must commit
to the membership fee before being matched to a merchant, all consumers purchasing from
stores that accept debit cards will always use their debit cards and leave home without cash,
because they face a positive probability of being mugged when carrying cash.
Merchants must make at least as much pro¯t from accepting debit cards than only ac-
cepting cash. Per domestic customer (expected) pro¯ts for merchant i in country A when
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cash(i), are:
ZA
cash(i) = Á1¯½(¼A(i) ¡ h);
and when accepting domestic debit cards, ZA
d (i):
ZA




Note that by accepting debit cards merchants attract additional sales because of safe transit
of domestic consumers. Merchants accept debit cards only when ZA
cash(i) · ZA
d (i).10 This
inequality yields a threshold pro¯t margin ¹ ¼A, above which merchants accept debit cards for
payment. Hence, the proportion of merchants in country A willing to accept debit cards is:
®A




We observe that ®A
opt 2 [0;1] if and only if fA 2 [½h;1 ¡ ½(1 ¡ h)]. The decision to accept
domestic debit cards is independent from foreign sales, since card acceptance does not change
revenues from a foreigner who must pay in cash.










Equation (3) expresses the highest ¯xed fee, FA
max, as a proportion of v0; that consumers
are willing to pay for holding a debit card. The consumer ¯xed fee internalizes the network
e®ect that consumers are willing to pay more for the card when merchant acceptance increases.
When fA = ½h, debit card acceptance is complete, ®A = 1, and therefore FA
max is set at its
highest level, FA
max = ¯ (1 ¡ ½)=(Á1+Á2)v0. In contrast, when fA = 1¡½(1¡h), acceptance is
zero, ®A = 0, and the ¯xed fee must also be zero, FA
max = 0: Furthermore, when foreign sales
are relatively common, the value of holding a card diminishes, since cross-border payments
need to be e®ected in cash, i.e. FA
max ! 0 as ¯ ! 0. Debit cards also lose their value to
10Our model does not capture business stealing incentives as a driver for card acceptance. See Rochet and
Tirole (2003) and Wright (2004).
11All proofs of lemmas and propositions are in the appendix. We used Mathematica 7.0 for algebraic
calculations, these are available upon request.
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That is, if v0 = 0, then FA
max = 0.
Now, we solve the card networks's pro¯t maximization problem for the consumer and
merchant fees. The network maximizes its expected per-consumer pro¯t:
¦A
N(FA;fA;®A) = Á1¯®A(fA ¡ cA) + (Á1 + Á2)FA;
subject to: FA = FA
max(fA); ®A = ®A
opt(fA):
Proposition 1 The debit card merchant fee f¤






(cA + 1 ¡ ½(1 ¡ h)) ¡
1
2
(1 ¡ ½)v0: (4)
The optimal debit card fee f¤




and an optimal consumer's ¯xed debit card fee, F¤
A = FA
max(f¤
A). When the processing cost,
cA, and cash handling cost, h, increases, the optimal merchant fee, f¤
A, increases. An increase
in the safety probability, ½, generally decreases the merchant fee, since safer transit reduces
the need for debit cards yielding lower merchant fees. Observe that optimal merchant fees
do not depend on foreign sales (through ¯);since domestic card acceptance does not change
revenues from foreign sales.
The card network tries to capture merchant and consumer surplus through appropriate
pricing of both sides. When merchant extraction of consumer surplus is low, the card
network will try to capture the remaining consumer surplus by setting low merchant fees,
thereby increasing acceptance which allows higher consumer ¯xed fees. In particular, if
v0 ¸ vd = 1 + h ¡ (h ¡ cA)=(1 ¡ ½), the card network's pricing problem is characterized
by a corner solution with f¤
A = ½h and ®A
opt(½h) = 1. Strong pricing power by merchants
leaves little room to extract from consumers by the card network, and hence ¯xed fees will
be lower and merchant fees higher. Hence, the degree of merchant pricing power shifts the
balance of payment fees. When v0 < vd, proposition 1 characterizes an interior solution with
incomplete acceptance. Figure 4 illustrates these two possible cases.
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December 2009Figure 4: Merchant pricing power and debit card pro¯t
Ρh










aL v0=0.10: Hinterior solutionL









bL v0=1.25: Hcorner solutionL
Note: In left panel, interior solution v0 < ¹ vd with f¤
A > ½h and ®¤
A < 1; in right panel, corner solution
v0 ¸ ¹ vd with f¤
A = ½h and ®¤
A = 1. Chosen parameter values: cA = 0:0025, ½ = 0:99, Á1 = 0:99,
Á2 = 0:005, h = 0:001, ¯ = 0:99, and N = 1. These values yield: ¹ vd = 1:15.
5.2 Country B: credit card pricing
Country B is a credit card country. Compared to debit cards, credit cards do not only protect
against theft but they also o®er an insurance against insu±cient funds before shopping.
Consumers bene¯t from additional consumption possibilities, and also merchants bene¯t
from making sales to those consumers without funds in the morning. However, running a
credit card system is more costly than a debit card system due to higher default risk and
higher processing costs (including monitoring and screening activities).12 We endogenously
determine the proportion of merchants in country B that accepts credit cards and denote
it as ®B. Because credit cards may not be accepted by all merchants, consumers must use
cash for some purchases, including foreign sales. Consumers can consume in an additional
¯®B(1 ¡ ½)+ ¯®B(1 ¡ Á1) states of nature.
Consumers are willing to hold a credit card if the ¯xed fee FB, is less than or equal to
the expected utility from additional consumption. Their participation constraint is:
Á1½v0 · (Á1(1 ¡ ¯®B)½ + ¯®B)v0 ¡ (Á1 + Á2)FB: (5)
Solving (as an equality) yields the maximum debit card fee, FB
max, that consumers are willing
12In our model, default risk is assumed exogenous and fully absorbed by the card network. Although the
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®B.
Merchants must make at least as much pro¯t from accepting credit cards than only




cash(i) = Á1¯½(¼B(i) ¡ h):








Merchants accept credit cards only when ZB
cash(i) · ZB
c (i). This inequality yields a threshold
pro¯t margin ¹ ¼B, above which merchants accept credit cards for payment. Hence, the
proportion of merchants in country B willing to accept credit cards is:
®B





opt 2 [0;1] if and only if fB 2 [½Á1h;1 ¡ ½Á1(1 ¡ h)], and that the decision to
accept domestic credit cards is not in°uenced by the proportion of domestic vs. foreign sales,
¯.










Equation (7) expresses the highest ¯xed fee, FB
max, that consumers are willing to pay
given the probability of safe transit, ½, the probabilities of receiving income, Á1 and Á2, the
handling cost of cash, h, and the merchant fee, fB. Merchant acceptance of credit cards is
higher when fB is lower, which increases the consumer willingness to pay higher ¯xed fees.
Domestic credit cards o®er no value added when consumers are never matched to domestic
merchants, or when merchants have already extracted all consumer surplus by setting high
prices p = v. Hence, when ¯ = 0 or v0 = 0, credit cards must be zero priced for consumers.
Now, we solve the card networks's pro¯t maximization problem for the consumer and
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¦B
N(FB;fB;®B) = ¯®B(fB ¡ cB) + (Á1 + Á2)FB ¡ (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)¯®B;
subject to: FB = FB
max(fB); ®B = ®B
opt(fB):
Proposition 2 The credit card merchant fee f¤
B that maximizes the credit card network0s





(cB + 1 ¡ ½Á1(1 ¡ h)) +
1
2
(1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2) ¡
1
2
(1 ¡ ½Á1)v0: (8)
Proposition 2 characterizes an interior solution (with incomplete merchant acceptance) if
v0 2 [0;vc), with vc = 1 + h ¡ (h ¡ cB + (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2))=(1 ¡ ½Á1). For v0 ¸ vc, a corner
solution determines the pricing problem yielding f¤
B = ½Á1h and ®B
opt(½Á1h) = 1.
5.3 Price and welfare comparison
Compared to pro¯t-maximizing debit card merchant fees, optimal credit card merchant fees
take into account additional default risk (through 1¡Á1¡Á2) and income insurance (through
Á1). Given their pro¯t margins, merchants need to trade o® these additional bene¯ts of
credit cards against higher fees. Consumers are equally well o®, their remaining surplus
is completely extracted by both card networks in both countries. Table 3 indicates that,
grosso modo, debit cards are cheaper than credit cards for merchants. This price di®erential
relative to the probability of early income determines whether card acceptance is higher in
country A or in country B. In the high cost case, due of low turnover, the credit card
network of country B makes less pro¯t than the debit card network of country A. Further,
an increase in merchant pricing power (lower v0) is accompanied by higher merchant fees.
That is, diminished opportunities to extract from consumers forces card networks to set
higher merchant fees, which dampens card acceptance. Higher merchant pricing shifts the
balance of prices from consumers towards merchants. This is illustrated in the table by lower
price ratios F¤
max=f¤ when v0 decreases.
The welfare consequences of a cash-only economy are potentially severe. Consumers
cannot consume if they are mugged on the way to the merchant or if their income arrives
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Country A (debit card) Country B (credit card)
v0 = 0 v0 = 0:10 v0 = 0 v0 = 0:10
cA = 0 cA = cA
H cA = 0 cA = cA
H cB = 0 cB = cB
H cB = 0 cB = cB
H
f¤ 0.0055 0.0067 0.0050 0.0062 0.0129 0.0167 0.0119 0.0157
Fmax(f¤) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0005
®opt(f¤) 0.5495 0.4245 0.5995 0.4745 0.3990 0.2106 0.4490 0.2606
F¤
max=f¤ 0.0000 0.0000 0.1182 0.0748 0.0000 0.0000 0.0744 0.0329
¦(f¤) 0.0030 0.0018 0.0035 0.0022 0.0031 0.0009 0.0040 0.0013
W(f¤) 0.4908 0.4896 0.5894 0.5880 0.4918 0.4893 0.5908 0.5878
Note: We set: cA
H = 0:0025 and cB
H = 0:0075. Other parameter values set to h = 0:001, ½ = 0:99,
Á1 = 0:99, Á2 = 0:005, ¯ = 0:99, v0 = 0:10, and N = 1.
at night. Moreover, merchants' cash handling cost may also be considerable. These costs
can (partly) be avoided when payment cards are introduced, but their bene¯ts must also be
weighed against increased processing cost and default risk.
As a benchmark, in a cash-only environment, the expected consumption of a consumer is
Á1½v0 and the average merchant pro¯t is Á1½(1=2 ¡ h). Card networks make no pro¯t in a
cash only economy. Total welfare in a cash-only economy is thus given by
Wcash = Á1½(v0 + 1=2 ¡ h): (9)
Expected total welfare of debit card usage in country A is derived by summing up expected
consumer utility,
WA


















and expected card network pro¯ts,
WA
N = Á1¯®A(fA ¡ cA) + (Á1 + Á2)FA:
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Observe that in our model the ¯xed fee is a pure transfer from the consumer to the card
network, and hence drops out in the social welfare calculation. If the social planner in
country A is able to only set merchant fees, it should maximize total welfare WA under the
merchant's participation constraint ®A
opt(fA) = 1 ¡ (fA ¡ ½h)=(1 ¡ ½).







C = (Á1(1 ¡ ¯®B)½ + ¯®B)v0 ¡ (Á1 + Á2)FB;
WB














N = ¯®B(fB ¡ cB) + (Á1 + Á2)FB ¡ (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)¯®B:
Country B's social planner should maximize total welfare WB subject to the merchant's
participation constraint ®B
opt(fB) = 1 ¡ (fA ¡ ½Á1h)=(1 ¡ ½Á1).
Proposition 3 The debit card and credit card merchant fees fSW
A and fSW
B that maximize
social welfare in country A and B are given by:
fSW
A = cA +
(1 ¡ ¯)½
2¯
¡ (1 ¡ ½)v0; and (12)
fSW
B = cB +
(1 ¡ ¯)½Á1
2¯
+ (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2) ¡ (1 ¡ ½Á1)v0: (13)
We observe that socially optimal merchant fees are partly cost-based. Both debit card and
credit card merchant fees incorporate processing cost, \incompatibility" cost (as measured by
(1¡¯)=2¯), and potential default risk. Consumer surplus extraction by card networks lowers
the merchant fees so as to increase card acceptance. With full pricing power by merchants
(v0 = 0), the card network cannot charge consumers at all (zero ¯xed fees) and merchants
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and socially optimal merchant fees become \fully" cost-based.
While pro¯t-maximizing card networks do not take the cost of cross-border payments
into account in their pricing behavior (see (4) and (8)), the social planner recognizes the
diminishing card value to both consumers and merchants when the event of being matched
to a foreign merchant|a sale that requires cash|becomes more likely. Card usage becomes
relatively expensive and translates into higher merchant fees. Depending on processing cost,
handling cost of cash, potential default risk, and the likelihood of cross-border payments,
socially optimal merchant fees may turn out to be higher than pro¯t-maximizing merchant
fees, dampening socially optimal card usage. Moreover, while the handling cost of cash does
not a®ect the socially optimal merchant fee, it does so through merchant acceptance. Lower
handling cost of cash decreases merchant acceptance but not the merchant fee|all else being
equal.
Table 4 illustrates some of these ¯ndings. Given the parameter values used in the example,
an economy without frictions (no theft, no income uncertainty) would result in a welfare level
of 0.60. The table depicts what \social gap" exists regarding the use of cash, debit cards
and credit cards. The table further shows that the socially optimal merchant fee is higher
than the pro¯t-maximizing one in country A. This suggests that debit cards are overused
in country A. Note that social welfare is neutral with respect to the consumer ¯xed fee.
The social planner's choice is e®ectively bounded by the consumer's participation constraint
FA
max(fSW
A ). Setting zero ¯xed fees results in lowest pro¯t for the card network. As shown
in the table, the reverse ¯nding is true for country B, where the socially optimal merchant
fee is lower than the pro¯t-maximizing one. Debit card usage in country A generates higher
social welfare than credit card usage in country B. Higher processing cost and default risk
make credit card usage less attractive from a social point of view. Both card systems improve
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Country A (debit card) Country B (credit card)
cash monopoly max welfare monopoly max welfare
f¤ 0.0062 0.0065 0.0157 0.0155
Fmax(f¤) 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000
®opt(f¤) 0.4745 0.4490 0.2606 0.2724
F¤
max=f¤ 0.0748 0.0000 0.0329 0.0000
¦(f¤) 0.0000 0.0022 0.0018 0.0013 0.0008
W(f¤) 0.5871 0.5880 0.5881 0.5878 0.5878
Note: Other parameter values set to h = 0:001, cA = 0:0025, cB = 0:0075, ½ = 0:99, Á1 = 0:99,
Á2 = 0:005, ¯ = 0:99, v0 = 0:10, and N = 1.
6 Market outcomes of SEPA
The creation of SEPA can be associated with di®erent market outcomes. When all payments
are treated as domestic|without national fragmentations|it is likely that strong scale ef-
fects spur substantial consolidation of payment networks and payment infrastructures across
countries, so that ultimately only a few card networks survive. We study three di®erent
scenario's. First, we analyze be a monopolistic credit card network for the complete area
A and B with 2N consumers. Second, we study a competitive duopolistic situation where
a credit card and debit card networks compete for business in a (heterogeneous) Bertrand
fashion. Third, we analyze the case of two competitive debit card networks. In a SEPA
environment all payment cards are compatible so that the need to carry cash when matched
to a foreign merchant disappears. Hence, less payments are potentially lost through theft.
Moreover, scale e®ects dampen processing cost, which makes running a large card system
more cost e±cient.
6.1 Compatible monopolistic credit card network
The pricing problem where only one credit card network operates in the entire region of size
2N is very similar to credit card pricing in country B in the pre-SEPA phase. The only
di®erence is that the probability of being matched to a foreign merchant, 1 ¡ ¯, becomes
irrelevant, since all cards have become compatible. All else being equal, this implies that the
optimal consumer ¯xed fee changes but not the optimal merchant fee. We further assume
that due to positive scale e®ects, the SEPA processing cost of a credit card payment, cc, is
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assume cA · cc < cB.
Based on previous analysis, we retrieve:





(cc + 1 ¡ ½Á1(1 ¡ h)) +
1
2
(1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2) ¡
1
2
(1 ¡ ½Á1)v0: (14)




sults in a ¯xed fee Fmax
M (f¤). With lower processing cost and no foreign card incompatibility,
it is obvious that SEPA implies lower optimal merchant fees and greater card acceptance in
country B. Merchants in country A might be facing higher payment fees which must be
traded o® against (expected) additional sales by accepting credit cards (instead of debit
cards in the pre-SEPA phase). Consumers are indi®erent, their surplus is always completely
extracted by paying maximum ¯xed fees in every state of the world.
6.2 Competition between a credit card and a debit card network
Although positive scale e®ects makes card payments more e±cient relative to cash, monop-
olistic pricing potentially reduces the pass through of these bene¯ts to consumers and mer-
chants. Consumers and merchants are likely to bene¯t the most from the creation of SEPA
when su±cient competition in the card payments market alleviates potential monopolistic
tendencies.
We analyze the case where a debit card and a credit card network compete for business
to maximize their pro¯ts. We critically assume here that consumers fully \multihome" in
the sense that they subscribe to both networks and holding both cards (or alternatively an
integrated one with both a debit and a credit functionality), but that merchants \singlehome"
in the sense that they only accept one card|debit or credit.13 Only merchants with high
pro¯t margins accept credit cards, intermediate merchants accept debit cards, and low-end
merchants only accept cash.
13In payments, multihoming on both the consumer and merchant side is often observed. However, this case
is very di±cult to analyze without imposing further restrictions on users' behavior, see e.g. Armstrong (2006),
Bolt and SoramÄ aki (2008), Chakravorti and Roson (2006), and Guthrie and Wright (2007).
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network charges fd and Fd. We assume that cd · cc, suggesting that a debit card network
is cheaper to operate than a credit card network:
Consumers are willing to hold both cards when:
Á1½v0 · (Á1((1 ¡ ®)½ + ®) + (1 ¡ Á1)®c)v0 ¡ (Á1 + Á2)FT; (15)
where FT denotes the total ¯xed fee that consumers are willing to pay for holding both cards,
® denotes the proportion of merchants that accept either a debit card or a credit card, and
®c the proportion that only accept credit cards. Debit card acceptance follows from ®¡®c.









This implies acceptances ®opt(fd) = 1 ¡ ¹ ¼d(fd) and ®
opt
c (fd;fc) = 1 ¡ ¹ ¼dc(fd;fc).14
Given these acceptance criterions we can solve for the maximum total ¯xed fee that the
consumer is willing to pay for holding both cards.
Lemma 3 The maximum total card fee, Fmax




1 ¡ fc ¡ ½Á1(1 ¡ h)
Á1 + Á2
v0: (17)
The total fee that a consumer is willing to pay does not depend on the debit card merchant
fee. Debit cards and credit cards are e®ectively the same instruments when income arrives
in the morning, only when income is late holding a credit card allows consumption. Given
the acceptances of debit and credit cards, we can also calculate the individual contributions
to the total fee. That is Fmax
T (fd;fc) = Fmax
d (fd;fc) + Fmax
c (fd;fc). These individual
contributions will depend on both fd and fc. We verify:
Fmax
c (fd;fc) =
(1 ¡ fc ¡ Á1(1 ¡ fd))(1 ¡ ½Á1)




Á1((1 ¡ ½)fc ¡ (1 ¡ ½Á1)fd + (1 ¡ Á1)½h)
(1 ¡ Á1)(Á1 + Á2)
v0:
14Note that we must check in equilibrium that total card usage is larger than credit card usage otherwise
debit and credit cards would not co-exist.
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¦c(Fc;fc;®c) = ®c(fc ¡ cc) + (Á1 + Á2)Fc ¡ (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)®c
subject to: Fc = Fmax
c (fd;fc); ®c = ®opt
c (fd;fc);
while the debit card network maximizes:
¦d(Fd;fd;®d) = Á1®d(fd ¡ cd) + (Á1 + Á2)Fd
subject to: Fd = Fmax
d (fd;fc); ®d = ®opt(fd) ¡ ®opt
c (fd;fc):





(cc + 1 ¡ Á1(1 ¡ fd)) +
1
2
(1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2) ¡
1
2












(1 ¡ ½Á1)v0, (19)
which then yield unique equilibrium merchant fees (f¤
c ;f¤
d) (see appendix).
Proposition 5 Under SEPA, heterogeneous competition between a debit card and credit card


















6.3 Competition between two debit card networks
Another possible SEPA scenario might involve two debit card networks competing for the
enlarged payment market with compatibility across borders. Obviously, if they could tac-
itly collude, they would split the market among themselves, setting monopoly merchant fees,
equally dividing total consumer ¯xed fees, thereby evenly sharing monopoly pro¯ts. Natu-
rally, this is not a stable outcome, the threat of undercutting the merchant fee is a credible
disruptive force.
Suppose an initial situation with identical merchant fees so that the merchant side of the
market is equally divided among the two networks. Undercutting on the merchant fee by one
of the networks will attract all the debit card accepting merchants, leaving zero transaction
volume to the opposing network. This will trigger a \Bertrand" sequence of undercuts until
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total consumer ¯xed fee. Note that we assume here that consumers hold both debit cards,
but that merchants only accept one|the least expensive.15
Assume that both (identical) debit card networks incur equal processing cost, cd. They
charge merchant fees, fi
d, i = 1;2. Consumers are willing to pay a total ¯xed fee Fmax
d for















d ¡ ½(1 ¡ h)
Á1 + Á2
v0; ®d(fi
d) = 1 ¡
fd ¡ ½h
1 ¡ ½
; i = 1;2:
Solving for fi
d yields f¤¤
d = cd ¡ (1 ¡ ½)v0. Both debit card networks receive Fmax(f¤¤
d )=2 =
v0Á1(1 ¡ cd + (1 ¡ ½)v0 ¡ ½(1 ¡ h))=(2(Á1 + Á2)) in consumer ¯xed fees, and each network
serves half of the market in terms of accepting merchants, ®d(f¤¤
d )=2.
Proposition 6 Under SEPA, homogeneous competition between two debit card networks
yields merchant fee f1
d = f2
d = f¤¤








d )=2. The merchant fee f¤¤
d is socially optimal.
Note that f¤¤
d is equal to the socially optimal debit card fee as derived in section 5.3,
proposition 3, when ¯ = 1. Hence, in our model, homogeneous Bertrand competition
between two debit card networks yields a socially optimal outcome. The social planner is
however not concerned with the distribution of surplus among agents. In this competitive
case, the networks charge a ¯xed fee to consumers extracting all their surplus.
6.4 Welfare comparison
Under SEPA, cross-country network incompatibility disappears and economies of scale in pro-
cessing dampen operating cost. We already showed that homogeneous debit card competition
yields socially optimal outcomes. However, under a monopolistic credit card SEPA regime,
consumers and merchants may su®er from excessive rent extraction by the monopolistic card
network. Socially optimal pricing when only credit cards are issued is qualitatively equal
15When both sides multihome, the standard undercutting argument does not apply anymore. Undercutting
on one side while compensating the other might be a successful price strategy.
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¯ = 1. Hence, the socially optimal credit card merchant fee is given by:
fSW
M = cc + (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2) ¡ (1 ¡ ½Á1)v0: (20)
The socially optimal SEPA merchant fee when only credit cards are issued is smaller than
the monopolistic merchant fee (14) when processing costs are su±ciently small.
When both debit cards and credit cards are issued in a SEPA environment (where con-
sumers multihome and merchants singlehome), the social planner must take care that credit
cards and debit cards are not over- or underused. Total expected welfare is now given by
WSEPA(fc;fd;®;®c) = WC + WM + WN; (21)
where
WC = (Á1((1 ¡ ®)½ + ®) + (1 ¡ Á1)®c)v0 ¡ (Á1 + Á2)FT;






+ Á1(® ¡ ®c)
µ











WN = Á1(® ¡ ®c)(fd ¡ cd) + ®c(fc ¡ cc) + (Á1 + Á2)FT ¡ (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2)®c:
The social planner should maximize WSEPA subject to ® = 1 ¡ (fd ¡ ½h)=(1 ¡ ½) and
®c = (fc ¡ Á1fd)=(1 ¡ Á1).
Proposition 7 Under SEPA, when both debit cards and credit cards exist, the merchant fees
fSW
d and fSW
c that maximize total social welfare are given by:
fSW
d = cd ¡ (1 ¡ ½)v0; and (22)
fSW
c = cc + (1 ¡ Á1 ¡ Á2) ¡ (1 ¡ ½Á1)v0: (23)
Observe that the socially optimal SEPA merchant fees (22)-(23) are qualitatively equal
to the pre-SEPA merchant fees (12)-(13), except for the cost of incompatibility as measured
by ¯. Naturally, potential economies of scale cd · cA and cc · cB will have a dampening
e®ect on merchant fee levels. Note that v0 = 0 induces fully cost-based merchant fees.
When extracting from consumers becomes impossible for the social planner, the merchants
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pre-SEPA phase SEPA
Country A Country B credit debit vs credit debit vs debit
monop welfare monop welfare monop welfare comp welfare comp welfare
fd 0.0062 0.0065 0.0037 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
fc 0.0157 0.0155 0.0144 0.0080 0.0108 0.0080
Fd 0.0005 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000
Fc 0.0005 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000
®d 0.4745 0.4490 0.4427 0.6015 0.9490 0.9490
®c 0.2606 0.2724 0.3234 0.6467 0.2839 0.3475
s 0.0748 0.0000 0.0329 0.0000 0.0448 0.0000 0.0523 0.0000 0.6295 0.0000
¦ 0.0022 0.0018 0.0013 0.0008 0.0021 -0.0013 0.0018 -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0009
W 0.5880 0.5881 0.5878 0.5878 0.5902 0.5912 0.5919 0.5921 0.5915 0.5915
Note: We de¯ne s = F=f and set cA = cd = 0:0025, cB = 0:0075 and cc = 0:005. Other parameter
values set to h = 0:001, ½ = 0:99, Á1 = 0:99, Á2 = 0:005, ¯ = 0:99, v0 = 0:1, and N = 1.
will bear all the cost of card usage. Without any feedback from merchant acceptance to a
higher consumer willingness to pay, the market becomes e®ectively one-sided, where marginal
cost equals marginal revenue in a social optimum (when v0 = 0).
Table 5 compares prices and social welfare across countries during the pre-SEPA phase and
under SEPA. The table shows that introducing competition dramatically decreases merchant
fees for both debit and credit cards in both competitive scenario's. In our example, total card
usage under SEPA increases to around 44+28=72 percent in the debit vs credit case, and even
to 95 percent for debit vs debit. In contrast, card acceptance in country A and country B was
only down to only 47, respectively, 26 percent in the pre-SEPA phase. Not surprisingly, due to
competition, total card network pro¯ts are less than before. Under SEPA, as the table shows,
debit card acceptance is higher than credit card acceptance when credit cards compete with
debit cards, although this result may be reversed when default risk and/or processing cost
di®erentials become small. Social welfare peaks when both types of cards are competitively
issued under SEPA. High-end merchants prefer to accept credit cards to increase sales when
some consumers have not yet received income. If default risk is not too high, this mix of issued
debit and credit cards raises social return. Relatively low socially optimal merchant fees for
debit and credit cards would increase total card acceptance in our example to 60+35=95
percent. Observe that heterogeneous competition does not yield socially optimal merchant
fees, while homogeneous competition does. We also notice that under SEPA with zero ¯xed
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is to transfer funds from consumers to card networks, for example through charging ¯xed fees
to consumers.16 One can show that setting FT = Fmax
T (fSW
d ;fSW
c ) yields a Ramsey pricing
outcome, where card networks just break even.
7 Conclusion
The creation of SEPA will have a decisive in°uence on Europe's future payments landscape.
SEPA is making an important contribution to the European internal market, as it is ex-
pected to not only foster competition and innovation, but also improve business conditions
for customers. By increasing Europe's competitiveness, SEPA is aimed at making an im-
portant contribution to the implementation of the Lisbon agenda. Economic literature has
already shown that economic bene¯ts can be expected from standardization of retail payment
instruments and consolidation in the payment processing industry.
Payment pricing and competitive e±ciency has recently attracted a lot of attention and
controversy among academics and policymakers. Payment cards are widespread in Europe
and became the most used non-cash payment instrument in the euro area. But there are
some dark clouds on the horizon. Although SEPA is intended to increase general customer
satisfaction and economic e±ciency, it is giving rise to the discontinuation of widely accepted
card schemes. And despite SEPA's e®orts to support the competitiveness of Europe, there
is the actual risk of decreased competition when only a few payment schemes are likely to
\survive". This has called for an European-led initiative to create at least one additional
European card scheme.
In the light of these developments, this paper studies the pricing and welfare implica-
tions of creating SEPA. We examine three di®erent SEPA market outcomes: a credit-card
monopoly, and two competitive scenario's, debit vs credit and debit vs. debit. In these
duopolistic environments, a debit card network and a credit card network strive for market
share and pro¯t. In our analysis, payment cards create additional possibilities to consume
and avoid the merchant cost of cash. However, these bene¯ts must be optimally traded o®
16We implicitly assume that any funds needed to cover the card networks' losses can be raised in a non-
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not equal to the pro¯t-maximizing one.
In this paper, the main economic drivers for SEPA are network compatibility and economies
of scale. Compatible systems increase the value of cards and reduce the use of cash.
Economies of scale lower processing cost making large card systems more cost e±cient. The
emergence of a new European card scheme could provide a decisive push to solve interoper-
ability problems and overcome costly current fragmentation in the European cards market.
The paper concludes that increased competition drives down merchant fees and increases
card acceptance. However, heterogeneous competition between debit and credit cards need
not yield socially optimal outcomes. Consumers and merchants are likely to bene¯t the
most from the creation of SEPA when su±cient competition in the card payments market
alleviates potential monopolistic tendencies.
The paper argues that there is room for a MIF to achieve optimal consumer and merchant
fees, taking safety, income uncertainty, default risk, merchant's pricing power, and the avoided
cost of cash at the retailers side into account. Our analysis may provide a ¯rst basis for further
study of the main questions underlying SEPA: which existing payment card business models
will survive, and which new business models will emerge? Without favoring any particular
proposed new European card scheme solution, this paper suggests that the emergence of at
least one additional European card scheme would be a viable way forward to achieve an
e±cient, competitive and integrated European card payments market.
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Proof of Lemma 1:
Solving (1) as an equality yields maximum debit card fee, FA
max, as a function ®A and ex-
ogenous parameters. Substituting acceptance decision ®A
opt(fA), see (2), gives FA
max(fA) of
Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Substituting FA
max(fA) and ®A
opt(fA) in pro¯t function ¦A
N(FA;fA;®A) and solving for fA
(uniquely) yields f¤
A.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Solving (5) as an equality yields maximum credit card fee, FB
max, as a function ®B and ex-
ogenous parameters. Substituting acceptance decision ®B
opt(fB), see (6), gives FB
max(fB) of
Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Substituting FB
max(fB) and ®B
opt(fB) in pro¯t function ¦B
N(FB;fB;®B) and solving for fB
(uniquely) yields f¤
B.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Substituting ®A
opt(fA) in welfare function WA(fA;®A) and solving for fA (uniquely) yields
fSW
A . Note that the ¯xed fee FA drops out in the calculations. The same logic applies to the
derivation of fSW
B .
Proof of Proposition 4:
See proof of proposition 2, setting ¯ = 1.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Solving (15) as an equality yields maximum total fee, FB
T , as a function ® and ®c and exoge-
nous parameters. Substituting acceptance decisions ®opt(fd) and ®
opt
c (fd;fc), see (16), gives
FT(fd;fc) of Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The intersection of reaction functions fR
c (fd) and fR





(2cc + v((3½ ¡ 1)Á ¡ 2)))(1 ¡ ½Á) ¡ Á(¡cd(1 ¡ ½Á) + (4 ¡ h)½(1 ¡ Á) ¡ 2½Á2 + 4) + 2(2 ¡ Á2)
4 ¡ 3½Á ¡ Á
f¤
d =
cc(1 ¡ ½) + ½(2(1 ¡ cd)Á + 2h(1 ¡ Á) + 3v((1 ¡ ½)Á + 1) + Á2) + 2cd ¡ 3v ¡ 2(½ + Á ¡ 1) ¡ Á2
4 ¡ 3½Á ¡ Á
Proof of Proposition 6:
First, no network can set a merchant fee higher than its opponent, otherwise it would attract






Second, undercutting the merchant fee drives pro¯ts down to zero. Third, zero pro¯ts are
obtained when f¤¤
d = cd ¡ (1 ¡ ½)v0. There is no better reply than to set an equal merchant
fee f¤¤
d by both networks. They equally share the market and receive half of the ¯xed fee
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December 2009Proof of Proposition 7:
Substituting ® = 1 ¡ (fd ¡ ½h)=(1 ¡ ½) and ®c = (fc ¡ Á1fd)=(1 ¡ Á1) in welfare function
WSEPA(fc;fd;®;®c) and solving for fc and fd (uniquely) yields fSW
d and fSW
c . Note that
the total ¯xed fee FT drops out in the calculations.
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